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Global Migration and European Integration
GuY DE LUSIGNAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is it not ironic? Over the same period, the Cold War ends with the
implosion of the communist bloc, the Berlin Wall falls, and the European
Single Market and the European Economic Area come into being. The
western world rejoices at the birth of new democracies and "Euro-optimism"
reaches a climax with the European Council of Maastricht. However, this
period is also marked by the resurgence of nationalism accompanied by the
most gruesome civil wars and ethnic cleansing operations in Europe since
World War I.
The free movement of Oieople and the opening of borders within the
European Union raise fears in the Member States of renewed waves of legal
and illegal immigrants and of refugees seeking political asylum. Political
uncertainties in our present world economy appear more serious than under
communism.
Without a doubt there is a global migration crisis. First, since 1960
over 35 million people from the developing countries have taken up
residence in the industrialized economies (including about 6 million
illegally) and approximately 1.5 million more join them each year. Second,
as a result of poverty, drought, and ethnic and civil wars, there are
migratory movements within the developing countries as well as
redeployment of populations in central and eastern Europe (for instance,
following the reunification of Germany and the return of former Soviet
Union soldiers to Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine). Third, 12 to 15 million
people are internally displaced in developing countries and about 14 to 16
million more can fairly be termed political refugees, five percent of whom
find their way to the rich countries.'
* Visiting Professor, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA),
Bloomington, formerly Deputy Director, Economic Development Institute of the World Bank,
Washington D.C.
1. The United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 54-55 (1992)
[hereinafter U.N. Report].
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All these movements are seen by many in the West as a serious threat
to the region and its wealth. Europeans in particular are worried
at the increasingly ominous evidences of a new migration of peoples
from the east and from the south. There is more to this than
xenophobia. As the Modem Age began five hundred years ago, the
danger of invasions of Europe (a recurrent danger that had existed
for more than a thousand years) began to vanish. At the end of the
Modem Age that prospect, though in different forms, appears
again.2
This paper will first discuss four main reasons for concern. Secondly,
it will reflect briefly on the cases of Africa and France.' The third and
final part will conclude by giving a response to global migration from a
European perspective.
II. FOUR REASONS FOR CONCERN
A. The Population Issue
World population increased from 2 to 4 billion people between the
1920s and the mid-1970s. In 1990 world population was estimated at over
5 billion. The population of the twelve members of the European Union
was estimated at 345 million in 1992, that is, 6.5% of total world
population, compared with 9.6% in 1960. It is projected that by 2025 world
population will be around 8.5 billion while the population of the twelve
members of the European Union will decline, both as a percentage of total
world population (to 4%) and in absolute numbers, dropping to 340
million.4
As is clear from these numbers, Europe's population, like that of North
America and of Japan, is aging. In the course of the early years of the next
2. JOHN LUKACS, THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE END OF THE MODERN AGE
195 (1993).
3. The author is deliberately not discussing the migration aspects in unified Germany in light
of the excellent paper published in this Journal by Professor Jost Delbriick. Jost Delbrilck, Global
Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45 (1994).
4. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 1992 REPORT 80-93 [hereinafter
EUROSTAT],
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century (2000-2020), it is expected that the over-sixty age group will grow
from 22% to 27% of the population. The active group, aged between 20
and 59 and whose numbers will drop from 55% to 53% of the population
over the same period, will have to take care of the older group.
Furthermore, they will have the burden of supporting and educating the
under-twenty age group, a group whose numbers will also drop over the
period from 23% to 20% of the population.'
Population pressure, as the consequence of increased poverty in the least
developed countries as well as in the industrialized countries, has produced
legal and illegal immigrants and refugees, shanty towns, ghettos, urban
criminality, unemployment, and homelessness. Population pressure and high
unemployment nourish hopelessness and despair among the youth who do
not see a bright future. This bleak reality stimulates them to lash out
desperately and viciously at the symbols of consumer society.
As Europe's people age and their fertility rate declines, population
growth, particularly in the southern Mediterranean basin and in sub-Saharan
Africa, may produce a mass migration into western Europe.6 Similarly, as
insecurity and political instability prevail, minorities in central Europe will
flee west for fear of oppression and wars. This is not confined to Europe
only; similar fears have prompted immigration movements from Haiti and
central America to North America.
B. The Unemployment Crisis
The industrialized and rich economies, especially in western Europe,
have been hurt by the most serious unemployment since the Great
Depression. Seventeen million people, more than 11% of the labor force,
are unemployed in the European Union today. Recession and loss of jobs
have stricken all classes and employment categories: from young university
5. See id. at 80-93.
6. This points to the need for immigration into western Europe, particularly beyond the years
2000-2025. Despite the present unemployment, immigrants will be needed to fill jobs such as those
involved with taking care of the elderly. This view is shared by some scholars, see, e.g., Thomas
Straubhaar, Allocational and Distributional Aspects of Future Immigration to Western Europe, 26 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 462, 477-78 (1992), but it is contended by others that a "considerable reserve of...
labor in Europe ... yet remain[s] to be mobilized." David Coleman, Does Europe Need Immigrants?,
26 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 413, 433 (1992).
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graduates to unskilled and skilled manufacturing workers to mid and high-
level cadres, technicians, managers, and professionals.
C. Economies in Transition
The economies in transition of the former Soviet Union-above all
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus-face increasing difficulties. Most of the
population of these countries does not understand, or rather does not accept,
the implications of democracy, development, and free-market economy
resulting from the end of the Cold War and of communism, namely a shift
out of the "command economy" or "State capitalism."
People in these countries resent the reforms that their leaders claim are
necessary to become full partners in a free-market world economy. The
people are also not prepared to make more sacrifices than those they made
under the earlier regime. Some even say that they were better off under the
old regime, as harsh and oppressive as it was.
Thus, the results of recent parliamentarian elections (e.g., in Russia)
show how the people do not want to face the reasons for their predicament.
A zone of uncertainty has arisen that is a potential source of destabilization
and unrest. This zone also threatens European integration and peace.
D. Income Disparities
However, in the long run the most daunting worry is the persistent
disparity of income between the poorest and the richest. The one billion
people constituting the lower 20% of world population contribute only 1.4%
of world gross national product (GNP), 1.0% of world savings, and 1.3% of
world investment. As for the upper 20%, who number less than one billion,
their share is 82.7% of world GNP, 81.2% of world trade, 94.6% of
commercial lending, 80.6% of world domestic savings, and 80.5% of world
domestic investment.7
This disparity is where the danger lies. This is what is likely to put at
stake the future of world peace and the stability of the global economy as
the twenty-first century approaches. It is no wonder so many are discussing
the fear of clashes of civilizations or cultures.
7. U.N. Report, supra note I, at 34-38.
8. See generally LUKACS, supra note 2; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations,
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III. CASES IN POINT: AFRICA AND FRANCE
A good illustration of this trend in immigration issues is the case of
Africa and France. France still entertains close ties with Africa for historical
and sentimental reasons.
African migration movements would in themselves be worth a paper.
For the sake of brevity and conciseness it should be stressed here that Africa
continuously experiences intercontinental flows of political refugees or
others in addition to those who result from regional and interregional tribal
wars. These occurrences result from the marginalization of African "nation-
states" following the aftermath of independence. African "quasi" States, to
use the expression of Ari Zolberg,9 have permitted their governments to
open diplomatic representations with their "special" friendly countries,
especially those within the U.N. system, so that they might take part in an
intense dialogue with the Bretton Woods Institutions. Yet, despite their
resources and the ingeniousness of their people, these African States have
been discredited by autocratic-"kleptocratic" regimes that have plunged
them, over the last two decades, into economic and political chaos and
social degradation.
People flee sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons, the first of which is
to seek jobs and food in Europe and to send money back home. Second,
when they acquire full residency, they bring their family to their new
"home." People flee also for fear of war, of ethnic cleansing, or of political
instability."° Finally, they flee, and may do so in larger numbers in the
future, because integrists and fanatics shatter their citizens' hope for peace,
freedom, and a better quality of life.
In Europe, France has the longest and most diverse immigration
experience. For the last two centuries, France has shown itself ready to
grant political asylum to all opponents of oppression, injustice, and
totalitarianism. After World War I, when heavy casualties precipitated a
FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 23; Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Feb. 1994, at 44, 48.
9. See Aristide R. Zolberg, Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration, 2 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 153, 168-69 (1994).
10. Despite a few encouraging signs, the democratization process in sub-Saharan Africa still
leaves a lot to be desired. One gleam of hope is the elections and constitutional changes in South Africa,
which are the outcome of seventy years of fighting against apartheid. These events could have an
extraordinary influence in other parts of Africa.
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serious domestic population decline, France opened to migrant labor. First
came the Italians and the Poles, then the Spaniards following the Spanish
War, and after World War II and the rise of the decolonization movements,
workers came from Africa. More recently, France has attracted immigrants
from Asia (namely Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Vietnam) and from
central Europe, as have other members of the European Union.
Many of these workers, including Africans from both north and south
of the Sahara, settled in France and obtained either permanent resident alien
status or citizenship. Moreover, until recent legislative changes, citizenship
came automatically to their children born in France. According to former
territorial legislation based on jus soli, any child born in France of foreign
parents became French without any special procedure, provided the parents
had resided primarily in France for the preceding five years. It is interesting
to note that children of Algerians born after January 1, 1963, are French as
long as their parents were born before July 3, 1962, when Algeria was part
of France. Today one million French people are descendants of north
African migrant laborers, a substantial group of which is less than twenty-
five years old and plays an important role in French social, political, and
youth movements." In sum, today about 14 million people-that is, one
quarter of France's population-have a grandfather, grandmother, father, or
mother who was an immigrant and thus are French citizens underjus soli.12
Furthermore, what has turned migration into a migration crisis is the
flow of illegal immigrants and of refugees (particularly those from African
countries and from other developing countries) who request political asylum
but who in so many cases are in fact "illegal economic workers." In
addition, since 1989-1990, refugees from the former Yugoslavia and from
Romania have exacerbated the traditional flows of asylum and job seekers
11. They are part of those 600,000 young people who worry about jobs and a safe future. Many
of them, graduates, students, school drop-outs, and unemployed, demonstrated in March 1994 with
courage and determination in Paris and in other important cities of France against the unemployment
crisis and the inefficiency of the government.
12. In addition, there are 3.6 million foreign residents in France: 1.6 million are nationals from
other European Union (EU) members; 2.1 million are nationals from non-European Union members, of
whom 1.3 million are north African nationals. Less than half of this foreign population-l.6
million-are women, both from EU and non-EU countries. Finally, each year about 100,000 foreigners
obtain French nationality through naturalization. See Philippe Bernard, Polgmiques d Strasbourg, LE
MONDE, May 10-1I, 1992, at 9; Philippe Bernard, L 'immigration de travailleurs n a jamais cess6, LE
MONDE, Dec. 17, 1992, at 12; Philippe Bernard, Des modalitis d'entre et de sjour beaucoup plus
restrictives, LE MONDE, June I1, 1993, at 9.
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from sub-Saharan Africa. From a broader perspective, the question to
address is whether migration represents a threat to the notion of a nation-
state other than from an "anthropological" viewpoint, that is, the fear of the
"decay" of the species: the "fear that a certain race or culture will be
overwhelmed in a sea of 'lesser' peoples."13
In our globally interdependent economies, the notions of national
sovereignty and of nation-state are becoming illusory; yet, too many people
still want to think otherwise. For decades French authorities have
demonstrated a sad inconsistency in very willingly accepting foreigners
while, at the same time, expressing regrets and xenophobia. 4
Last year's reform of French immigration legislation, prompted by
conservative Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua, was endorsed by most
parties with the exception of those from left and center-left wings. This fact
is very revealing of the present climate in France. Indeed, demonstrations
in France against immigrant communities, mostly Arab or black African, are
condemned by political parties regardless of their political coloration. Still,
the main objective of the present French conservative government is to keep
the extreme right-wing parties from exploiting the deteriorating situation for
electoral purposes. In other words, there is a demonstration of political
concern over immigration growth, but none of these concerns stems from
humanitarian or democratic considerations.
Since January 1, 1994, French authorities have taken measures to
restrain illegal immigration and to control the entry of refugees. In addition,
the French Minister of Interior also wants to make it harder for legal
immigrants to acquire French citizenship, especially those from Arab or
Islamic countries. New policies reduce work permits, refuse visas for family
reunification, and prevent additional wives from polygamous marriages from
entering the country. These policies thus give enforcers less flexibility than
in the past in applying jus soli.'5 Furthermore, the policies are unwise
when viewed in light of previous demographic surveys of the French
13. See PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 39 (1993).
14. The French have always fought against racism and fascism. This fact has not prevented the
split in French society regarding the independence of Algeria, between those in favor of keeping Algeria
as part of France and those against it. Similarly, the history of Vichy France, Ptain, and the French pro-
Nazi militia, perturbs the French public.
IS. In its annual report published in March 1994, the French National Consultative Commission
on Human Rights condemned the Pasqua Law on immigration, this law being in contradiction with the
right of expatriation or the "right to leave" as per article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
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National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Estimates
compiled in 1991 show that depending on the extent of the drop in the
domestic fertility rate, France will require after the year 2000 around
150,000 and 165,000 immigrants per year, half men and half women."6
IV. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE
Similar feelings and policies toward immigration are found among other
members of the European Union, for example, in Germany and in Italy.
Among the EU nations, migration is a very high-risk, complex, and
politically charged issue, one that implicates a range of other diplomatic,
social, and economic issues. What follows is a critical analysis of some of
these issues and a listing of some suggested solutions.
First, since 1992, borders are open in theory and may be crossed with
no controls for European citizens. From the start, however, the free
movement of persons has raised serious problems. Controls and protections
are needed against drug smugglers, illegal immigrants, terrorists, and
political refugees. In particular, the Convention of Schengen of 1985 was
aimed at harmonizing restrictions among the twelve members of the
European Union (especially for asylum seekers), and at assuring that no
refugee wins asylum by coming overland through another country that had
not granted asylum. 17 Yet the Convention has had no practical effect
because the police forces of EU nations lack adequate computing
information systems. Another explanation could be the difficulties in trying
to apply the Convention in the context of differing national laws, traditions,
and political concerns.
Second, without agreeing with John Lukacs that the "respect for the
Europe of Brussels is melting away perhaps even faster than the respect for
the League of Nations had [sic] before the Second World War,"' 8 we
cannot but deplore, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the EU nation-
states' lack of courage, hesitation, and incoherence at the outburst of
nationalism and of ethnic cleansing. In the Balkans, traditional, calculating,
16. See tCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE, July 1991 (Report of the French Institut National De La
Statistique et Des ttudes lconomiques).
17. Out of the twelve Members of the European Union, nine have signed the Convention, while
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland have opted out. T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, FREE MOVEMENT
OF PERSONS IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCES 39, 51 (1993).
18. LuKACS, supra note 2, at 196.
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short-sighted, pre-World War II diplomacy seems at first to have overtaken
a sense of "Europeanness" without which European integration will reach
a dead end. This fact is not only regrettable but unacceptable and
incomprehensible. In this regard we fully share the views of scholars such
as Jirgen Habermas, who said:
[W]e really have to start taking the phenomenon of a multicultural
society seriously. In Europe, the composition of the population is
changing and this is taking place in a difficult economic climate
with high unemployment and an impression conveyed by the media
that ethnocentrism and the nation are once again a matter of central
importance. [At the same time, there is a manipulation in countries
of immigration where] xenophobic sentiments can be used as a
safety valve for growing discontent. 9
Habermas's remarks are quite in line with those of others who argue that
our western democracies are facing dual crises of confidence: a crisis of
society vis-A-vis its institutions and its political class, and a crisis of the
citizenry (communities, masses) among themselves. 2' These crises explain
the inefficiency and the insecurity, particularly in the countries facing
change and economic transition. For migrants and refugees, it has become
a crisis of solidarity. A similar situation exists for Africans and Arabs in
France who feel rejected both within and outside French society.
Presently, academics in Europe hold essentially similar views on the
tragic events in central Europe (for example, Bosnia) and in Africa (for
example, Rwanda). Passions and anxieties arising among both the "rich"
and the "poor" may further fuel individual violence and may lead to a return
to man's most primitive destructive and barbarian instincts.21
This is the meaning of unrest and civil wars in the former Marxist-
Leninist block (e.g., Armenia, Georgia, etc.), in addition to the tragedies in
the Balkans and in Africa. The racist movements and violence in western
Europe against immigrants and refugees, such as in Germany in 1993
19. "More Humility, Fewer Illusions " A Talk Between Adam Michnik and Jfirgen Habermas,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 24, 1994, at 24, 25.
20. See, e.g., Pierre Hassner, Un entretien avec Pierre Hassner: Nous entrons dans un nouveau
Moyen Age, LE MONDE, Oct. 27, 1992, at 2.
21. See Guy de Lusignan. Political Conditions of Development: Africa in the Year 2000 and
Beyond 22, in READINGS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, Paper #32, Jan. 1994).
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against Turks and Vietnamese, are more than an anticipation of what could
happen on a wider scale in the course of the next century should nations fall
back into renewed nationalistic violence as a result of political shifts, such
as those of the latest elections in Italy or Russia.
Third, there is a most provocative thought-that of a new "Limnes" or
border that might inspire the richest countries (with their own internal
problems and their own poor) to block migration from poorer countries.
Recalling Rome's destruction of Carthage as its attempt to protect the
Empire, the West also might be tempted to raise a "divide" to protect itself
and its civilization from the "new barbarians,"2 for instance by
establishing new international relations and privileged bonds with "buffer"
States, free zones, or ports around a delineated border.23  While such
"protection" would be hateful and unrealistic, another danger should also be
prevented: the temptation of regional, political, trade blocks such as
NAFTA, the European Union, and the Pan East Asian group with their
respective associated partners, to live in autarky and act in an atmosphere
of competing hegemony.
In conclusion, the integration of Europe has come to a crossroads. It is
sufficient to emphasize the inconsistency between the aspirations toward a
"European Consciousness" and a political union, and the determination
among most governments to preserve the privileges of the nation-state
against the global interests of the European Union and of its members. At
the moment when the European Union must decide upon a further
enlargement, when a European Parliament welcomes newly elected
parliamentarians and receives increased responsibilities, the leadership of the
Union appears shaken.
Not only will the "new" configuration of Europe be determined by the
limits of European enlargement, but equally important will be: what kind
of Europe the Europeans want or are ready to accept, and how can they
express their preferences about it? In other words, how does Europe see
itself in the twenty-first century? Will Europe not also become socially and
22. JEAN-CHRISTOPHE RUFFtN, L'EMPIRE ET LES NOUVEAUX BARBARES RUPTURE NORD-SUD 145
(1991).
23. Actually this thought seems similar to Huntington's point in Clash of Civilizations, supra note
8, regarding the reappearance of the ideological division of Europe between western Christianity and
Orthodox Christianity and Islam, and referring to William Wallace's eastern boundary of western
Christianity in the year 1550. See WILLIAM WALLACE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
16-17 (1990).
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ethnically different-not only economically different-from twentieth
century Europe? As for the future of the nation-state, at least in Europe, is
it not tied to the future constituent powers of the European Union?
Indeed, the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and its
implementation demonstrate the difficulties of European integration.
Europeans have seemed bruised since the end of the Cold War despite the
climax reached when the treaty was signed. Stanley Hoffman wonders
whether European integration is only the toy of technocrats in Brussels and
of politicians in the capitals, "a purely economic and bureaucratic
construction that shows few signs of becoming a nation."24 This raises one
of today's most serious problems for a united Europe: its "democratic
deficit." Indeed, the issue of a greater involvement of the people of Europe
in "common European" activities is of paramount importance for the future
of the integration. Not only should the actual powers of the European
Parliament be further reinforced, but the chairmanship of the European
Council and of the Commission should also become accountable vis-a-vis
the European citizenry. Since this is not at all the case today, it appears
imperative to protect and enhance further European identities, as a group of
nations, of regions, and of cultures. If the nation-state has become
"relativized" within the context of a single market,2" a larger span of
freedom has to be given to the local authorities so that Europeans who retain
their national citizenship have the real feeling that they are part of the
decisionmaking and implementation processes. Indeed, this should be
conceived at the regional or provincial level (for example, in Catalonia,
Lombardia, the Flemish and the Wallon provinces, Scotland, and
Wesphalia).26 Through decentralized participatory democracy within the
Union, nations may become somehow revitalized, provided they act in favor
of the Union and not against it.
Nevertheless, there remains the everlasting issue of the worldwide
economic and social disparities that are conducive to migrations and
conflicts. At the end of the day, this issue can be solved and consolidated
24. Stanley Hoffman, Goodbye to a United Europe?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, May 27,1993, at 27, 31;
see also Stanley Hoffman, Balance, Concert, Anarchy, or None of the Above, in THE SHAPE OF THE NEW
EUROPE 196, 194-220 (Gregory F. Treverton ed., 1992).
25. See Zolberg, supra note 9, at 162.
26. 1 would admit gladly .that this argument merits a much more in-depth analysis. It
encompasses the limits of the notion of Europeanness as well as its coexistence or cohabitation with its
peers in the western world.
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only by two parallel sets of imaginative and aggressive policies. The first
set, the easiest, would involve a comprehensive reappraisal of multilateral
and bilateral aid to make it more effective and more coherent to the
aspirations of the people of developing countries, and more respectful of the
limits of growth.27
The second. set is much more complex and difficult. It will require a
better understanding of the costs and benefits of free trade among countries
and their political trading blocks-their corresponding "common markets"
or economic-monetary unions. The people of the industrialized countries
will have to acquire better skills and be better trained in high technology
and services in order to get jobs, and they must accept that their future lies
outside of manufacturing and farming. Only through these efforts can the
people of the industrialized countries remain competitive and continue to
earn the high wages they receive relative to other countries, for instance,
those in central and eastern Europe.
Countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Chile, and Mauritius have
demonstrated how to achieve sustainable development and have become
highly competitive. Thanks to their high performance ratings, they are
coming closer to the industrialized economies. Thus, their experience has
to benefit those countries who have not yet succeeded and whose population
growth, political instability, and non-development are at least partly
responsible for global migration.
In short, only through better and more efficient trade relations and aid
policies is global migration likely to stabilize in the long term. Meanwhile,
the people of the developing countries will have to adapt themselves to a
new concept of international affairs, one that is no longer dominated by
east-west confrontation nor based on a north-south dialogue. They will need
to continue to make the necessary adjustments in institutions, capacity-
building, and in governance. This will not be achieved overnight and thus
these countries will not quickly put an end to migrant labor.28
27. In particular, the respective roles and procedures of the European Union, the United Nations,
and the Bretton Woods institutions should be seriously reconsidered.
28. For instance, east-west migration is likely to continue but governments should respond with
a stricter system of regulating legal and illegal immigration while recognizing the economic benefit of
such immigration. The European Union should encourage free trade beyond the present European
Economic Area and it should support major aid packages that will introduce reforms in the economies
in transition. See rJCHARD LAYARD ET AL., EAST-WEST MIGRATION 52, 63 (1992) (a report of the
World Institute for Development Economics Research).
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